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WORLD survival and progress in an atomic epoch depends on an effective 
international law. Yet several recent students of the subject conclude that any 
further attempt to improve international relations by legal means is not merely 
unrealistic and impractical, but also likely to result in more harm than good. 
Is this to be the final verdict? The purpose of this inquiry is to answer this 
question by analyzing the major contemporary theories of jurisprudence and 
their bearing on international law. 
LEGAL POSITIVISM 
Legal positivism delimits the subject matter of law to the cases and proposi- 
tions in law books and to the legal institutions which apply those propositions. 
In domestic law this restriction of the law to the positive law has been found 
wanting. Dean Roscoe Pound's strictures against this "give-it-up" philosophy 
are well known.1 Justice Holmes' and Brandeis' pragmatic conception of 
law as a social instrument for facing and resolving social problems rather 
than running away from them is now a commonplace. Increasingly important 
is Myres McDougal's observation that not merely British legal positivism but 
also American legal realism leave one with a type of law which is incapable 
of meeting either the opportunities or responsibilities of the contemporary 
world.2 It has remained, however, for a legal positivist, P. E. Corbett, to 
give the final reductio ad absurdurn to such a system of jurisprudence in his 
Law and Society in the Relations of States.3 Consider, for example, the theory 
of auto-limitation introduced by Jellinek to account for legal obligation in 
international law. Corbett shows the "inherent absurdity" of this position by 
noting that it offers "no explanation . . . for the view that while the will 
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of the State was essential to the birth of a rule, it was not essential for the 
purpose of keeping it alive."4 He shows the same to be true of the positivistic 
theories of Kelsen and Lauterpacht. 
The major problem confronting any legal theory is to account for social 
norms and legal obligation. At first the legal positivists and realists regarded 
their incapacity to account for the normative as an asset. Law, they said, does 
not involve value judgments; such judgments belong to philosophy and 
theology. Law is not to indulge in such supposedly speculative matters. 
Instead law is a science dealing with nothing but positive legal facts-hence 
the "realism" of the legal positivists, the early American legal realists and 
Corbett's description of his own approach to international law. But they never 
made clear how a subject such as law, in which even the judges of the positive 
law are inescapably engaged in decision making, can thus separate itself 
in this ivory tower manner from the ethical and ideological content of the 
concrete problems which judicial decisions are attempting to resolve. Finally 
even the legal positivists themselves were forced to face the fact of norms 
and attempt some theory of legal obligation. Kelsen, for example, saw (a) 
that there are no positive rules of law ever sufficiently positive to be effective 
which do not presuppose a legal norm carrying with it obligations; and (b) 
that consent and obligation are incompatible. Thus, as Corbett writes, 
"Kelsen and his school rendered the service of revealing . . . the hopeless 
inconsistencies of the doctrine that legal obligation can result directly from the 
will of the entity obliged."5 
Strangely enough, however, this final admission by Kelsen and Corbett 
that law presupposes moral obligation and hence has an essential connection 
with ethics never caused them to question their legal philosophy. Instead they 
begin by drawing a distinction between legal rules and the normative ethical 
factor which they, following Kelsen's terminology, call a "jural postulate" or 
a "grundnorm."6 This preserves the fiction of the independence of law from 
ethics providing one (a) identifies law with legal rules or with merely hypo- 
thetical propositions specifying the implications of the grundnorm for the 
legal rules and the judge's decision in applying them to a particular case and 
(b) assigns the grundnorm itself to some nonlegal subject such as ethics. 
But even Kelsen could hardly be satisfied with a legal philosophy which 
restricted law to rules presupposing a jural postulate about which the science 
of law has nothing to say. No alternative remains, therefore, but to see what 
kind of content legal positivism can give to the primary and basic grundnorm. 
Without this, as Corbett notes, Kelsen's theory of law is "an empty dialectic,"7 
and law "emerges, not as a method of social control, but as a system of thought 
4. Id. at 70. 
5. Id. at 73; Kelsen, The Pure Theory of Law, 50 L.Q. REV. 474 (1934). 
6. KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY (F LAW AND STATE 115 et seq. (1951); CORBETT, op. 
cit. supra note 3, at 72-3. 
7. CoRBErr, op. cit. supra note 3, at 73. 
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which declares itself beyond criticism so long as its entire content is logically 
derived from one fundamental principle or postulate."8 Lauterpacht and 
Kelsen sought therefore, the type of content for the jural postulate or 
grundnorm which a positivistic philosophy of law can provide. Lauterpacht 
offers the proposition, "[T]he will of the international community must be 
obeyed."9 Kelsen comes forth with the grundnorm: "The states ought to 
behave as they have customarily behaved."'0 
To assert either of these grundnorms is to admit explicitly that the posi- 
tivistic philosophy of international law can make no contribution to the bring- 
ing of disputes between nations under the rule of law to an extent greater 
than is, or has been, done. A more convincing demonstration of the impotence 
of legal positivism in international law can hardly be imagined. Curiously 
enough Corbett not only demonstrates these consequences, but also, because 
of his a priori assumption of legal positivism, acquiesces in the result. 
This result is quite independent of the particular branch of law which 
Corbett has chosen to investigate. The demonstration that a theory of 
law which bases legal obligation on assent can never justify the application 
of law to dissenters, holds as much for criminal law in the domestic field as 
it does for dissenters in the international arena. Hence, were this positivistic 
theory of legal obligation correct, domestic law which sends murderers to 
the electric chair without asking them whether they assent to the court's 
jurisdiction should not exist. A domestic law in which the individual 
reserves the right to decide whether the court has jurisdiction would place 
the private citizen in the same position in which nations now stand with 
regard to international law. And were this our present situation in domestic 
law, Corbett would undoubtedly have published a book called Law and 
Society in the Relations of Individual Persons and described himself as 
"realistic." In it he would maintain that anyone who attempts to achieve an 
effective domestic law of murder is misguided, building false hopes and 
doing more harm than good. 
But competent legal thinking involves more than the capacity and integrity 
to pursue one's philosophical premises to their consequences. A student of 
law can hardly call himself scientific or realistic unless he also faces the 
question of the validity of his premises. 
Apparently, this is precisely what Austin, the founder of English legal 
positivism, did before he died, with results similar to those of the foregoing 
analysis. In her preface to the posthumous edition of his Lectures on Juris- 
prudence or the Philosophy of Positive Law, his wife, Sarah, writes that 
Austin had refused to publish during his lifetime a second edition of this 
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its limitations and inadequacy.l She adds the copy of an advertisement found 
in his notes describing his new position in part as follows: 
Positive law (or jus), positive morality (or mos), together with the 
principles which form the text of both, are the inseparably-connected 
parts of a vast organic whole. To explain their several natures, and 
present them with their common relations, is the purpose of the essay 
on which the author is employed. . . . He (author) had thought of 
entitling the intended essay, the principles and relations of law, morals, 
and ethics: meaning by law, positive law; by morals, positive morals; 
and by ethics, the principles which are the test of both.12 
At times Kelsen seems about to make the same admission, only to 
withdraw again into the premises of his positivism. For example the first 
sentence of the section on Nomodynamics in his General Theory of Law and 
State is: "The legal order is a system of norms."l3 A few pages later, however, 
he writes: "A norm is a valid legal norm by virtue of the fact that it has 
been created according to a definite rule and by virtue thereof only."'4 A 
page later one reads: "Law is always positive law, and its positivity lies in the 
fact that it is created and annulled by acts of human beings, thus being 
independent of morality and similar norm systems. . . . The basic norm 
of a positive legal order is nothing but the fundamental rule according to 
which the various norms of the order are to be created."15 The latter state- 
ment suggests also that the solitary ethical proposition in legal science, which 
is its initial grundnorii, possesses little if any ethical content, but is instead 
merely a formal rule concerning how the more general and the more particular 
propositions of law are to be related when established in a scientific rather 
than a haphazard manner. 
There are also suggestions that Kelsen's legal positivism is compatible 
with and even presupposes the living law of sociological jurisprudence.l6 
This would be the case if the distinction between his pure theory of law and 
sociological jurisprudence were a purely verbal one, drawing the line between 
the activity of the jurist qua jurist and the activity of the sociologist of law 
qua sociologist. Were such the case, the relationship might be somewhat as 
follows: Any legal system is a system of norms. Furthermore any system of 
norms derives its more particular norms from more basic general normative 
postulates which might appropriately be termed the grundnorm. This grund- 
11. 1 AUSTIN, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE OR THE PHILOSOPHY OF POSITIVE LAW 
16-18 (Robert Campbell 4th rev. ed. 1873). 
12. Id. at 17. 
13. KELSEN, op. cit. supra note 6, at 110. 
14. Id. at 113. 
15. Id. at 114. 
16. EHRLICH, FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE SOCIOLOGY OF LAW 81, 369, 388, 401, 
419, cc. XX, XXI (1936). 
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norm of pure theory derives its validity and its ethical content, however, from 
the living law of sociological jurisprudence. 
The method of validating a Kelsenian grundnorm, as illustrated in the 
location of the normative authority of his Austrian Constitution of 1920 in 
the earliest Constitution of 1867,17 indicates, however, that such is not the 
case. Kelsen confirms this conclusion: "If we ask why the constitution is 
valid, perhaps we come upon an older constitution. Ultimately we reach 
some constitution that is the first historically. . . . The validity of this first 
constitution is the last presupposition, the final postulate, upon which the 
validity of all the norms of our legal order depends."18 Clearly if law is 
nothing but positive law, then the assumption of an ought for some first 
positive law must be one's basic grundnorm. Thus he continues, "It is 
postulated that one ought to behave-as the individual, or the individuals, who 
laid down the first constitution have ordained. This is the basic norm of the 
legal order under consideration."19 Kelsen adds that this "basic norm is not 
created in a legal procedure by a law-creating organ. It is not-as a positive legal 
norm is-valid because it is created in a certain way by a legal act, but it is 
valid because it is presupposed to be valid. . . .20 This is another way of 
saying that legal obligation has its basis not in any act of assent but in a 
primitive and hence irreducible, hypothetically a priori moral presupposition.21 
Here the neo-Kantian character of Kelsen's legal positivism reveals itself. 
But what is the validity of the initial presupposition? Why assume the 
validity of the first constitution? To these questions Kelsen replies: "That a 
norm of the kind just mentioned is the basic norm of the national legal order 
does not imply that it is impossible to go beyond that norm. Certainly one 
may ask why one has to respect the first constitution as a binding norm.... 
The characteristic of so-called legal positivism is, however, that it dispenses 
with any such . . . justification of the legal order. The ultimate hypothesis 
of positivism is the norm authorizing the historically first legislator."22 Clearly 
then, his pure theory of law does not presuppose the living law of sociological 
jurisprudence as a part of itself. In fact it would be self-contradictory for 
the pure theory of law to derive its grundnorm from something outside itself. 
For the essence of the pure theory of law is that the grundnorm with its 
ethical "imputation" is not a mere hypothetical a priori, but is instead a 
primitive, and hence irreducible a priori. 
At this point Kelsen's legal positivism becomes identical with the ethical 
jurisprudence of Morris and Felix Cohen. Nor is this an accident, for all 
three are neo-Kantians in their theory of ethics. They differ merely in the 
17. KELSEN, DIE VERFASSUNGSGESETZE DER REPUBLuK DEUTSCH-OSTEREJICH, Vols.
1-3 (1919), Vol. 4 (1920), Vol. 5 (1922). 
18. KELSEN, op. cit. supra note 6, at 115. 
19. Ibid. 
20. Id. at 116. 
21. Kelsen, Causality and Imputation, 61 ETHICS, No. 1 (1950). 
22. KELSEN, op. cit. supra note 6, at 116. 
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relation of their ethics to law. Kelsen would keep law independent of ethics 
except for the solitary "ought" of his basic grundnorm. The Cohens regard 
ethics as the essence of law. But for all three the ethical within law is an 
a priori which is a primitive and hence irreducible assumption. This follows 
from the basic philosophical assumption of neo-Kantianism that the "good" 
or the "ought" cannot be derived from the "is." 
NEO-KANTIAN ETHICAL JURISPRUDENCE 
The jurisprudence of the Cohens 23 has two merits. It does justice to the 
inescapably ethical character of any legal statute, i.e., its permission of 
certain and prohibition of other de facto conduct. Their ethical 
jurisprudence recognizes the futility of the attempt of Kelsen's pure theory 
of law to restrict the "ought" of legal science to a word in its first postulate 
referring to some present or past constitution of the positive law. In its place 
the Cohens introduce the richer basic ethical assumption which they term 
"justice" or "the good life." The remainder of law then becomes the application 
of this ethical ideal to the construction of the initial constitution, the legislator's 
creation of statutes under that constitution, and the judge's application of 
both to the concrete cases in his decisions. 
Were Soviet Russians, 19th Century American Republicans, Spanish 
Roman Catholics, Arab-bloc Muslims, New Deal Democrats and British 
Labour Party socialists in agreement on the specific basic ethical norm which 
defines "justice" or "the good life," the ethical jurisprudence of the Cohens 
would work and the basic problem of legal science would be solved. Un- 
fortunately this agreement does not exist. 
To provide any judge with a basic postulate of legal science containing the 
words "the good life" is of no use to him whatever, since any case involving 
a moral issue results from a conflict between at least two different conceptions 
of what "the good life" is. To put the matter in terms of contemporary 
symbolic logic, the expression, "the good life," is a variable; it is not a 
material constant. An ethical jurisprudence is inadequate in theory or in 
practice until the criterion for determining the value of this variable in any 
instance is specified. 
More explicitly this means that an ethical jurisprudence will be adequate 
only when its basic ethical assumptions are spelled out in detail with content, 
thereby giving the judge a criterion for choosing one normative principle in 
deciding the case rather than another. Furthermore, an adequate ethical juris- 
prudence must include the scientific method for designating this specific ethical 
content. When the Cohens take the concept of the ethical as a primitive and 
23. Morris R. Cohen: Philosophy and Legal Science, 32 COL. L. REV. 1103 (1932); 
REASON AND NATURE, 333-457 (1931); LAW AND THE SOCIAL ORDER (1933); FELIX 
COHEN: ETHICAL SYSTEMS AND LEGAL IDEALS, AN ESSAY ON THE FOUNDATION OF LEGAL 
CRITICISM (1933); The Problems of a Functional Jurisprudence, 1 MOD. L. REv. 5 
(1937-8). And see STAMMLER, THE THEORY OF JUSTICE (Husik's transl. 1925). 
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hence irreducible concept in ethics and law, this specification of the methodo- 
logical criterion and the attendant specific ethical norms which result from 
its application becomes impossible. As with Kelsen, it would be a violation 
of their concept of the ethical if such a criterion were found; for then the 
good or the legally obligatory would not be a primitive concept but would be 
defined in terms of the concepts designating the criterion. Such is the inevit- 
able consequence of any theory of law or ethics which affirms the ethical to 
be a basic assumption which is irreducible. It merely indicates that there 
must be an ethical assumption of some kind without either giving a clue as to 
what it is specifically, or providing a successful method for testing any 
specific ethical and legal norm such as laissez faire individualism, socialism, 
or communism. Notwithstanding the greater justice to the essentially 
ethical character of law which it promised, neo-Kantian ethical jurisprudence, 
then, is as barren ethically and legally as is the earlier legal positivism of 
Austin and of Kelsen's pure theory of law. 
Law is always possessed of specific normative content. Since neither the 
positive law nor a priori ethical jurisprudence give any clue to why the 
content of positive law is what it is, positive law must depend, because of its 
specific content in any given society, on something beyond both itself and the 
ethically a priori. Here it is necessary to introduce sociological jurisprudence 
with its thesis that the source of the content and the obligation of the 
positive law is in the underlying structure or living law of the particular 
society to which it refers. 
SOCIOLOGICAL JURISPRUDENCE 
The expression "sociological jurisprudence" will be used throughout this 
inquiry in its most general sense to include (a) the sociology of law, and 
(b) sociological jurisprudence in the more restricted sense; i.e., the applica- 
tion of the living law as determined by the sociology of law to judicial 
decisions. 
The earlier formation of this theory of law was given by Pound 2 and 
Ehrlich. Both failed to articulate clearly the precise manner in which the 
living law, as specified by sociology, determined the content of the ethical 
norms of the positive law. The tremendous erudition of Pound's jurispru- 
dence with its sensitivity to all schools of legal thought and its attendant eclec- 
ticism left open the question as to whether the sociologist's contribution sup- 
24. POUND, op. cit. supra, note 1; The Scope and Purpose of Sociological Jurispru- 
dence, 24 HARV. L. REV. 591 (1911), 25 HARV. L. REV. 140 (1911), 25 HARV. L. REV. 
489 (1912); Law and the Science of Law in Recent Theories, 43 YALE L. J. 525 (1934); 
A Survey of Social Interests, 57 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1943); INTRODUCTION TO AMERICAN 
LAW, DUNSTER HOUSE PAPERS NO. 3 (1919); INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF 
LAW 1-143 (1925); OUTLINES OF LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE CC. IV, V, VI (5th ed. 
1943). See also STONE, THE PROVINCE AND FUNCTION OF LAW; LAW AS LOGIC, JUSTICE, 
AND SOCIAL CONTROL (1950). 
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plied the ethical norms in whole or part or was to be supplemented or even 
judged by ethical norms coming a priori from ethical jurisprudence proper. 
Ehrlich, particularly in his criterion of effective positive law as that which 
corresponds to the underlying living law of sociology, suggested that the 
ethical norms of the positive law might come from the sociological contribu- 
tion alone. Even so he specified no sociological method for localizing and 
determining the factor in society which provides positive law with its specific 
ethical content. He merely expressed the hope, in the concluding chapters 
of his classic work, that such a scientific sociological jurisprudence would be 
constructed and suggested the form, modeled on the economic science of 
the Austrian School, which it might take.25 Speaking of this economic science 
which, although deductively formulated, is based on observation, he added: 
"And sociology also, including the sociology of law, must be a science of 
observation."26 
But this type of scientific method raises a difficulty if sociological juris- 
prudence is not in the end to be as barren with respect to the specification of 
ethical norms as is legal positivism or the neo-Kantian ethical jurisprudence. 
Kelsen puts his finger on this difficulty when he notes that contemporary 
sociology "is not a study which seeks to determine how men ought to act, 
but how they actually do act and must act according to the laws of cause 
and effect. ... This transformation of the science of social relationships from 
an ethical science into a causal sociology, explaining the reality of actual 
conduct and therefore indifferent to values, is largely accomplished today. It 
is, fundamentally, a withdrawal of social theory before an object which it has 
lost all hope of mastering. . . . [I]t abandons its essential problem as insolu- 
ble."27 In his more recent paper, Causality and Imputation,28 Kelsen 
affirms this situation to be inescapable, because the laws of any empirical 
science are of necessity laws of temporal cause and effect whereas legal 
science entails "imputation" (i.e., a minimum a priori ethical grundnorm) and 
the freedom of the moral individual from the empirical, temporal laws of cause 
and effect. 
But does sociological jurisprudence need to be so poverty-stricken ethically? 
Before turning to recent developments to answer this question, one caution is 
to be noted. Even if the answer should be in the affirmative, this would not 
establish the validity of Kelsen's pure theory or the Cohens' ethical jurispru- 
dence. The result would be merely that sociological jurisprudence is as 
vacuous and inadequate ethically and legally as is legal positivism or neo-Kan- 
tian ethical jurisprudence. For let it not be forgotten that of Kelsen's grund- 
norm it can always be asked by any person confronted with such a law: "Why 
this particular grundnorm rather than one which I might suggest? Why this 
25. EHRLICH, op. cit. supra note 16, at cc. XX, XXI. 
26. Id. at 473. 
27. KELSEN, op. cit. supra note 6, at 391. 
28. Kelsen, supra note 21. 
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particular content freely imputed by you rather than a different content which 
I freely will?" Similarly of the Cohens the question can be asked: "Why the 
specific content of 'the good life' which you read into your otherwise 
vacuous ethical norm rather than the different specific content which I 
might suggest?" To all these questions neither legal positivism nor a priori 
ethical jurisprudence has an answer. And without an answer, legal and 
ethical obligation is meaningless and law and ethics are not merely relative 
but also arbitrary. 
However necessary it is in legal science, as Kelsen and the Cohens have 
correctly noted, to distinguish "the ought" and "the good life" from the "is," 
it is equally necessary to provide some sense in which they can be related to 
and thereby judged as to their truth or falsity with respect to some "is." 
Otherwise no reason can be given for the ethical postulates of legal science 
taking one specific ethical content rather than another, and both ethics and 
law become completely arbitrary with no meaning whatever for either ethical 
or legal obligation. 
Underhill Moore's sociological jurisprudence29 represents a tremendous 
advance over both the pure theory of law and ethical jurisprudence. What 
he sought was a legal science which could not merely demonstrate that some 
grundnorm has to be assumed, but also specify its content and verify the one 
that is to be assumed. 
His procedure consisted in accepting not merely the fact that the basic 
postulates of positive law are normative but also that they are norms with a 
specific content which is only one of many possible specific contents. From 
this it follows that the ethical postulates of positive law cannot be true 
a priori, but must find their content and validation in some subject outside 
both the positive law and a priori ethics. Following Pound and Ehrlich, 
29. Moore, An Institutional Approach to the Law of Commercial Banking, 38 YALE 
L. J. 703-19 (1929) (with Theodore S. Hope, Jr.); Legal and Institutional Methods 
Applied to the Debiting of Direct Discounts (with Gilbert Sussman): I. Legal Method, 
Banker's Set-Off, 40 YALE L. J. 381-400 (1931); II. Institutional Method, 40 YALE L. J. 
555-75 (1931); III. Connecticut Studies, 40 YALE L. J. 752-78 (1931); IV. South Caro- 
lina and Pennsylvania Studies, 40 YALE L. J. 928-53 (1931); V. The New York Study, 
40 YALE L. J. 1055-73 (1931); VI. The Decisions, the Institutions, and the Degrees of 
Deviation, 40 YALE L. J. 1219-50 (1931); and Appendix, 40 YALE L. J. 1251-72 (1931); 
The Current Account and Set-Offs Between an Insolvent Bank and Its Customer, 41 
YALE L. J. 1109-33 (1932) (with Gilbert Sussman); The Lawyer's Law, 41 YALE L. J. 
566-76 (1932) (with Gilbert Sussman); Legal and Institutional Methods Applied to 
Orders to Stop Payment of Checks (with Gilbert Sussman and C. E. Brand): I. Legal 
Method, 42 YALE L. J. 817-62 (1933); II. Institutional Method, 42 YALE L. J. 1198-1235 
(1933); Drawing Against Uncollected Checks, 45 YALE L. J. 1-38 (1935); 45 YALE L. J. 
260-92 (1935) (with Gilbert Sussman and Emma Corstvet); Law and Learning Theory: 
A Study in Legal Control, 53 YALE L. J. 1-136 (1943) (with Charles C. Callahan); My 
Philosophy of Law in CREDOS OF SIXTEEN AMERICAN SCHOLARS 201-28 (1941); Law 
and Learning Theory: A Study in Legal Control (with Charles C. Callahan), 53 YALE 
L.J. (1943); Northrop, Underhill Moore's Legal Science: Its Nature and Significance, 
59 YALE L. J. 196-213 (1950). 
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Underhill Moore identified this subject with the living law of sociological 
jurisprudence, i.e., the inner order of society as determinable empirically by 
sociological science. 
His problem then became that of providing an objectively determinable 
specification of the content of the living law in any given state of any given social 
system. He believed, quite correctly, that previous sociological jurisprudence 
had failed, because, although it assumed the living law to be objective for a 
given community, its methods of determining it were so intuitive and various 
that little agreement existed among different sociological jurists upon what 
the objective living law is. Too often the objective living law of a given 
sociological jurist was nothing but the image of this jurist's pet, arbitrarily 
chosen, positive law reform. This made sociological jurisprudence as arbitrary 
as Kelsen's pure theory of law or the Cohens' ethical jurisprudence. 
Underhill Moore achieved this required objective specification of the 
content of the living law. He assumed that whatever the subjective ethical 
norms of the many individual people making up the living law may be, 
these norms, to the extent that they are socially and legally significant, will 
show in their overt spacio-temporal behavior. Spacio-temporal behavior is 
a publicly determinable objective thing quite independent of any observer's 
normative preference. Hence Underhill Moore solved the problem of provid- 
ing an objectively determinable specification of the living law of a given 
society at a given time by identifying it with the high-frequency overt behavior 
of all the people in that society. This amounted to an identification of the 
living law with the common norms of the majority of its people. Thus, what 
Kelsen and the Cohens said sociological jurisprudence could not do, was 
in part at least achieved: Two meanings were provided for the distinction 
between the "ought" and the "is"-one of these two meanings centering in 
the relation of the positive law to the living law, the other centering in the 
living law itself. 
The meaning which centers in the relation of positive law to living law is as 
follows: The positive legal norm which corresponds to the high-frequency be- 
havior of the living law is the positive law norm which ought to be. The 
positive legal norm which does not correspond to the high-frequency behavior 
of the living law is the one which ought not to be. This provides the judge, con- 
fronted with a specific case and two possible norms for deciding it, with a 
scientifically verifiable and objective criterion of the norm to be chosen. A 
positive legal norm which exists but does not correspond to the high-frequency 
behavior of the living law is a positive ethical and legal norm which "is" but 
not one which "ought" to be. This makes the sociological jurist's criterion 
of good positive law identical with Ehrlich's criterion 80 of effective positive 
law. 
The criterion for distinguishing the "ought" from the "is" within the 
living law alone is equally precise in Underhill Moore's sociological juris- 
30. EHRLICH, op. cit. supra note 16, at cc. III, IV. 
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prudence. The "ought" of the living law of a given society is its high- 
frequency behavior, i.e., the common norms of the majority of its members. 
The immoral and illegal behavior of the living law is the incompatible low- 
frequency behavior, which if allowed to persist and accumulate, would under- 
mine the common norms of the living law defined by the high-frequency be- 
havior. 
In his seminars, Underhill Moore often pointed out one difficulty in the 
application of this distinction. It arises because there is nothing in the theory 
to indicate at what specific point in the continuous curve of total-living-law 
behavior, the line between high-frequency and low-frequency behavior is to 
be chosen. This difficulty, however, applies only to borderline cases. It does 
not arise if the extreme low-frequency behavior is compared to the highest 
point of the high-frequency behavior. 
However Underhill Moore saw that these two distinctions between the 
"ought" and "is" are not sufficient. The insufficiency appears when one 
questions, as one must, the ethical validity of the high-frequency behavior 
of the living law in any given society at any given time. The fact that the 
high-frequency behavior of a given society is what it is does not necessarily 
imply that it ought to be what it is. Rarely, if ever, are the high-frequency 
normative accomplishments of a people identical with their ideals. Also there 
clearly exist societies with high-frequency behavior which one must and ought 
to brand as evil. And in any society there is high-frequency behavior which 
should be reformed. 
An ethical and legal science which cannot provide meaning and a criterion 
for designating the high-frequency behavior of the living law of a given 
society as bad or in need of reform is defective. Otherwise good law and 
conduct would always have to be the de facto high-frequency behavior of the 
present status quo. One can, of course, wait for the living law to change and 
then bring the positive law into accord with this change. This would provide 
a positive legal norm and also a new living law norm different from that of 
today's high frequency status quo "is." Even so, one would not be able today 
to say that today's society is "bad" or in need of "reform." Yet this is what 
every reformer and every moral man frequently does and must say. 
The question, therefore, arose in Underhill Moore's mind: "Is it possible 
today to determine the content of tomorrow's high-frequency living law? 
If so, the norm specified by tomorrow's high-frequency living law could 
be used today as the "ought" for evaluating and reforming today's high- 
frequency living law. 
Underhill Moore went to the physicists for an answer to this question. The 
reason for turning to natural science at this point was that physics is a 
science in which, given the state of a system today, tomorrow's state can be 
calculated today. Study of the scientific method of physics showed that for 
such a sociological jurisprudence two requirements are necessary. First, the 
scientific theory must be deductively formulated. Wlhen physics remained 
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in the purely inductive natural history stage it was unable to achieve this 
required predictive power. This made it quite clear to Underhill Moore that 
the traditional inductive descriptions of societies and the studies of social 
trends after the manner of the historical sociological jurists or even the policy- 
forming law of McDougal and Lasswell are quite inadequate. Such inductive 
studies merely throw arbitrarily chosen facts in one's eyes, rather than give 
one the over-all high-frequency ordering relations (termed by Ehrlich "the 
inner order of society"31) necessary to evaluate the facts by putting them in 
their true proportions. Second, the deductively formulated postulates of the 
theory must specify a small number of key variables correlated indirectly 
with inductively given operations such that, given the present empirical 
values of these few key variables, the inner order of the present state of the 
system is defined and the values for tomorrow's state can be deduced. 
Sociological jurisprudence should be able to designate the normative element 
of the living law by determining empirically the value of the smallest possible 
number of variables, preferably only one. Otherwise before sociological juris- 
prudence can be of any use to the jurist or judge he must have the sociologist 
place an endless amount of inductive data on his desk. From this stand- 
point, the policy-forming law of Lasswell and McDougal 32 with some seven 
secondary and three primary value variables, is most questionable, if not as 
ethically vacuous as legal positivism or a priori ethical jurisprudence. Have 
Lasswell and McDougal in practice done more than substitute several 
vacuous ethical concepts for the one vacuous ethical notion of the Cohens' 
a priori ethical jurisprudence, thereby merely multiplying the vacuity of the 
latter system ten-fold? Moreover, even if a non-arbitrary criterion is 
given of the particular inductive data selected to define operationally each of 
the ten value variables, the sociological jurisprudence of Lasswell and 
McDougal has not provided an objective determination of the living law 
until it also includes an invariant law or formula specifying the inner order 
of the ten value variables. This follows because, as Ehrlich made clear, 
the living law is not the observed facts of sociology but the inner order of 
the facts. 
In any event, it was to avoid such weaknesses that Underhill Moore's 
sociological jursiprudence took its final direction. He turned to a causal 
sociological jurisprudence not, as Kelsen suggests, because of an uncritical 
aping of the method of natural science nor because of an admission of the in- 
capacity of sociological jurisprudence to provide a meaning for the "ought" 
as distinct from the "is," but because it offered a positive way to provide 
meaning for such a distinction. If he were able by such a scientific method to 
31. Ibid. 
32. McDougal, supra note 2; The Role of Law in World Politics, 20 Miss. L. J. 253- 
83 (1949); Lasswell & McDougal, Legal Education and Public Policy: Professional 
Training in the Public Interest, 52 YALE L. J. 203-95 (1943): LASSWELL, THE ANALYSIS 
OF POLITICAL BEHAVIOUR (1948). 
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deduce the norms constituting tomorrow's high-frequency behavior from to- 
day's high-frequency behavior, he would have today a meaning for the 
"ought" different from today's living law high-frequency "is" and hence an 
objective, empirically verifiable criterion of normative social reform. 
Even though he chose the very simplest social system imaginable, where if 
anywhere a causal sociological jurisprudence might be possible, the result 
was a failure. After years of selection of every possible variable in the subject 
matter, Underhill Moore and Callahan 33 found that they could not obtain a 
formula connecting the high-frequency content of the present state of the social 
system to that of its future state without assuming the new norm as an independ- 
ent variable. In short the future state could be deduced only if the new norm were 
assumed. Hence it could not be used to define the new norm. There is no 
greater tribute to the integrity of Underhill Moore as a legal scientist than 
the fact that he not only saw this negative result but accepted it. This is the 
sense in which his own work ended in partial disappointment. 
Nonetheless he demonstrated that sociological jurisprudence can provide an 
objective, empirically verifiable criterion to distinguish the "is" of the positive 
law from its "ought" as identified with the high-frequency "is" of the living 
law. He showed also that it can provide within the living law for a similarly 
objective distinction between its "ought" as identified with its high-frequency 
behavior and immoral and illegal behavior as defined by that low-frequency 
behavior which, if not curbed, will make the norms of the high-frequency 
behavior impossible. The latter distinction makes clear how the "ought" of 
positive law operates to bring the low-frequency behavior of the minority into 
compatibility with the high-frequency communal behavior and inner order of 
society necessary for the community's existence. What he failed to achieve 
was a criterion equally objective for designating when the high-frequency 
living law is bad or in need of reform. 
The simplicity of the social behavior which Underhill Moore studied (i.e., 
the total distribution of parked cars on a street in New Haven) makes it 
highly probable that his negative finding with respect to the deduction of to- 
morrow's living law from today's is definitive for any sociological jurispru- 
dence which identifies any society's living law with objectively determined, 
overt, high-frequency behavior. There is a theoretical reason, pointed out 
by Karl Popper 4 among others, for believing that such a criterion for the 
"ought" of today's living law would be incorrect even if it were achieved. 
It is that if such a causal determinism held for norms, then moral and legal 
reform would not only be unnecessary but also impossible. For if such deter- 
minism exists, on the one hand, man can do nothing about it; and on the 
other hand, the reform will come automatically without one's doing anything 
about it. 
33. Moore & Callahan, Law and Learning Theory, supra note 29; see also Northrop, 
s4tpra note 29. 
34. POPPER, THE OPEN SOCIETY AND ITS ENEMIES (1950). 
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In accepting this negative result it is necessary to avoid Popper's error of 
concluding that the meaning of the word "ought" as applied to the living 
law is an ethical a priori. This error concerning ethical norms with respect to 
the living law is similar to that of Kelsen and the Cohens with respect to the 
positive law. An abstract, vacuous, ethical "ought" is of no more use in 
distinguishing the good from the bad in the living law than it is in the 
positive law. 
If it is meaningful to say that high-frequency living law behavior is good 
or bad, then content must be given to the words "good" and "bad." And an 
objective criterion for specifying this content must be indicated. Is there 
any way, other than that attempted by Underhill Moore which ended in 
failure, for doing this? Recent developments in sociology, cultural anthro- 
pology and neurological behavioristic psychology provide part of the answer 
to this question. 
These developments also specify the manner in which the psychological 
theory underlying the sociological jurisprudence of Underhill Moore and 
of Lasswell and McDougal must be supplemented. When this supplementation 
is made, a new and simpler objective method of sociological jurisprudence 
becomes evident. It requires the empirical determination of but one inde- 
pendent variable in any society in order to specify the ethical and legal 
content of its living law. This new method has the merit also of avoiding 
the weakness, noted by Underhill Moore in his own system, of not being 
able objectively, rather than arbitrarily, to draw the line between high- 
frequency or ethical living law behavior and low-frequency or non-ethical 
living law behavior. And this new sociological jurisprudence points the way 
beyond itself to another objective criterion for judging the living law in any 
specific instance to be "good" or "bad" or in need of specifiable reform. 
The last vestige of the relative, the dogmatic and the arbitrary is thereby 
removed from ethical and legal science. Before turning to this new method 
it is necessary to consider the capacity of traditional sociological jurisprudence 
to provide an effective international law. 
TRADITIONAL SOCIOLOGICAL JURISPRUDENCE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 
The sociological jurist contends that if any positive law is to be effective it 
must correspond to the underlying living law. To take this thesis seriously 
is to realize immediately one major reason (quite apart from the fact that 
it is so much the creation of legal positivists) why international law is so 
weak, calling forth such meagre living law sanctions for itself. Existent inter- 
national law is the creation of but one historical portion of one living law 
culture of the world. More specifically it is the product of late medieval and 
early modern European jurists, watered down and weakened by later 18th 
and 19th century European positivists. Having thus its living law roots solely 
in one small piece of but one local culture of the world, is it any wonder that 
the many diverse nations and cultures of the world refuse to grant it any 
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unqualified jurisdiction over even a small piece of their particular national 
and international affairs? 
Nor is there any need to wonder why even the recent modern portion of 
the West, whose legal jurists have created the existent international law, 
should have such little confidence in it. Rooted as the recent international law 
is, and its recent jurists have been, in either legal positivism or a priori 
ethical jurisprudence, the norms of international law of necessity have to be 
left in the form of vacuous ethical grundnorms. Under such circumstances 
not even a modern Western nation can trust its fate to such an international 
law, even though it be its own creation. For the time must inevitably come, 
if such a vacuously defined international law is accepted without reservation, 
when its grundnorms will be given content by representatives of cultures 
such as contemporary Soviet Russia, Middle Eastern Islam or Hindu India. 
Such content will differ from and even in some cases be antithetical to that 
of the living law of our own culture. 
To look at contemporary international law, therefore, from the standpoint 
of sociological jurisprudence is to realize why this international law is weak 
and devoid of living law support. Such will be the inevitable response to 
any international law grounded in but one culture of the world or in legal 
positivism, vacuous ethical jurisprudence, or the traditional sociological juris- 
prudence. 
There is no need, however, for international law to remain in this poverty- 
stricken condition. Provided sociological jurisprudence can prescribe an 
objective method for determining the world's diverse living laws, it can point 
the way to an effective international law and to a world legal order to which 
the diverse peoples and cultures of the world can give a specified jurisdiction 
without reservation. The first step along this way consists in objectively 
determining the underlying specific living law of the world's major different 
cultures and then bringing the positive international law into correspondence 
with this specified diversity of the world's major living laws. Difficulties, 
which will be discussed later, will obviously arise when this is done. 
An objective method for determining the living law of any people, nation 
or culture must be found. Clearly this is a task for which the traditional 
lawyer is quite incompetent. The living law of each of the many cultures and 
peoples of the world can be specified only by a direct scientific study of these 
cultures. The sciences concerned with such a study are cultural sociology 
and cultural anthropology. More, however, is revealed by these sciences than 
is necessary for, or relevant to, the jurist's purposes. The relevant items 
become evident when one notes that positive law is always concerned with 
norms. Positive law specifies certain specific grundnorms and particular 
statutes which serve as a moral.and juridical measuring rod to distinguish 
in any culture the behavior which is legal from that which is not. 
What international law needs, therefore, from the cultural sciences is the 
specific normative factor in the specific living law of each of the major cultures 
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of the world. It is because of its concern primarily with the normative factor in 
the living law of any society that sociological or anthropological jurisprudence 
distinguishes itself from sociology or anthropology proper. Thus an adequate 
sociological or anthropological jurisprudence must first determine the key 
independent variable in any culture which, when its value is determined 
empirically for that culture, gives its specific living law grundnorm. What is 
this independent variable? Three independent developments in contemporary 
sociology, anthropology and psychology specify the answer to this question. 
These developments are illustrated in P. A. Sorokin's concept of "logico- 
meaningful social causality," Clyde Kluckhohn's study of the Navaho Indian, 
and Warren S. McCulloch and Walter Pitts' theory of neurologically trapped 
universals. 
NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN SOCIAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE 
Logico-Meaningful Causality. Sorokin's inductive study of the major cul- 
tures of the world led him to the discovery that in the cultural sciences there 
are two types of causality.35 In the natural sciences only one of these two 
types occurs. The type of causality common to the natural and the cultural 
sciences is the one noted previously by Kelsen in his criticism of sociological 
jurisprudence. This type we shall call mechanical causality.36 Its essence 
is that given the determination of certain present facts, certain future ones can 
be deduced. 
Sorokin agrees with Kelsen that were all sociology and sociological juris- 
prudence of this mechanical causal type, the sociology of law and sociological 
jurisprudence would be of no use in providing positive law with ethical 
grnadnorms possessing specific content. What distinguishes cultural science, 
however, from natural science is that mechanical causation in cultural science 
applies only to isolated factors in the system, not to the overall ordering 
relations of the cultural system as a whole. It was with this overall "inner 
order of society" that Ehrlich identified the living law in his Fundamental 
Principles of the Sociology of Law. Sorokin adds that the sociological 
causality which defines this overall inner order is logico-meaningful rather 
than mechanical. 
"The nature of logico-meaningful causality begins to become evident when 
one pursues the analogy of Newtonian mechanics in the cultural sciences as 
far as it will go. Any natural system designated by Newtonian mechanics 
has its entities. They are the physical or scientific objects. The cultural 
systems also have their entities. They are the human persons and their 
physical environment. When, in Newtonian mechanics, the postulates and 
35. SOROKIN, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL DYNAMICS (1937-1941); SOCIEYr, CULTURE 
AND PERSONALITY (1947); SOCIOCULTURAL CAUSALITY, SPACE, TIME (1943); see also 
MAQUET, THE SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE OF MANNHEIM AND SOROKIN (1951). 
36. See NORTHROP, THE LOGIC OF THE SCIENCES AND THE HUMANITIES 219-26 
(1947). 
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values of the variables defining the state of any system are specified, the order- 
ing relations of the system are made determinate. The mere specification, 
however, in any cultural system of the positions and momenta of the persons 
in that society is not sufficient to specify the ordering relations which define 
the culture of those persons. 
"An example will suffice to make this clear. In many village communities 
of India, Muslims and Hindus have lived together for centuries. Most of the 
Muslims are converts from Hinduism; thus ethnologically the peoples are for 
the most part identical. Hence, the cultural differences between Muslims and 
Hindus which are so great as to necessitate the present division of the 19th 
century India into Pakistan and New Delhi's India are not to be explained 
by physical, ethnological differences. The momenta and positions of the bodies 
of the Hindus and Muslims in any single village hardly account for the differ- 
ences in their two cultures. The position of Muslims and Hindus is identical 
since both are located in the same village. If one watched both groups walk- 
ing down the street there might be slight differences in their momenta, but 
hardly differences sufficient to account for the differences in culture. In fact 
we would suspect that where differences in momenta between Muslims and 
Hindus in the same village appeared, these differences would be the effect 
rather than the cause of the cultural differences. Clearly the cultural ordering 
relations are not given after the manner in which the ordering relations of 
natural systems exhibiting their mechanical causation are given. 
"What is the unique factor, in addition to the aforementioned physical 
factors, which must be determined in order to make the ordering relations, 
which incidentally define the ethos of a culture, determinate? Sorokin's 
answer is that this additional key variable, unique to cultural systems, is to be 
found in the meanings that the persons making up any single culture hold in 
common and use to conceptualize, order and integrate the raw data of their 
experience. It is because meanings are the key factor that Sorokin calls 
this unique causality of cultural science 'logico-meaningful causality.' 
"What this entails is that wherever there are two different cultures, the 
persons in those cultures are using different basic meanings or concepts to 
describe, systematize and integrate the data of their experience. The Hindus 
in the Indian villages are using those of Hinduism; the Muslims, those of 
Islam; and so we could go on beyond the Hindu villages to the rest of the 
world. Then we would say Soviet Russians are using those of Marx as in- 
terpreted by Lenin and Stalin. The traditional Chinese, those of Confucius; 
the Siamese, those of Buddhism, with a slight top layer of Hinduism; the 
Roman Catholics those of St. Thomas; the Americans those of Locke and 
Jefferson and Adam Smith and Mill and Jevons, and more recently Keynes. 
"Our example of the Indian village suggests also another point noted by 
Sorokin. The meanings used by a given people to describe, organize and 
interpret the data of their experience determine the ethos of their culture. I 
would even go further and say that they are its ethos. The word "good" is 
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literally nothing more than the name for the basic meanings of the hierarchy 
of all meanings used by a people to conceptualize themselves and their uni- 
verse. This follows from what has been said. For if the basic meanings define 
the ordering relations of a culture, they automatically define its living 
law, and the living law of a culture is its ethos. To these basic 
conceptual meanings the word "good" adds but one thing in addition to its 
designation of them, i.e., their application to, and use as a measure of, conduct. 
In short, ethics is the conceptualization of the data of experience, applied."3T 
And, it may be added, law is the application of ethics to society in the settling 
of its disputes. 
But what are basic meanings or concepts which define the living law ethics 
of a culture? The usual term for designating the basic concepts of any 
subject matter is philosophy. This is why the sociological jurist determines 
the value of the variable which specifies objectively the living law norms of 
a culture when he determines the indigenous philosophy of that culture. At 
this point Clyde Kluckhohn's anthropological studies become important. 
Philosophy of the Navaho Indians. Kluckhohn's anthropological study38 
is especially significant because the Navahos have no written literature. 
Nevertheless he found that they use positive legal norms different from those 
of the surrounding American culture in settling their disputes. The reason 
for this difference became evident only after he teased out of them the con- 
cepts which they used for describing, integrating and anticipating the facts of 
their experience. 
When their basic concepts were made overt and verified through conversa- 
tion with them, Kluckhohn found that the Navahos have a complete, integrated 
and articulate philosophy. Once this philosophy was made explicit, not only 
did their particular positive legal norms follow naturally, but also the reason 
for the inner ordering relations of their society became clear. Again, this 
time through the eyes of the science of cultural anthropology, the living law 
of a culture is made explicit when its philosophy is specified. 
Kluckhohn's study shows also that this specification can be made in a quite 
objective manner without the introduction of any arbitrarily chosen normative 
hypothesis upon the part of the investigator. Both the philosophy and the 
positive law which Kluckhohn found the Navaho to possess are different from 
the norms or the philosophy which he brought to the study from his own 
culture. Both the Navaho legal norms and the Navaho philosophy came to 
him as a surprise. 
But how can philosophy have this key significance in defining the specific 
content of the living law of a culture? Is not human, and hence social be- 
havior, a mere response to the stimuli of sex or hunger, with philosophy a 
37. Northrop, Philosophical Anthropology and World Law, 14 TRANSACTIONS OF 
THE NEW YOR:K ACADEMY OF SCIENCES 109-12 (1951). 
38. Kluckhohn, The Philosophy of the Navaho Indians in IDOLOGICAL DIFFERENCES 
AND WORLD ORDER C. XVII (Northrop ed. 1949). 
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mere pseudo-rationalization after the fact? At this point it is necessary to 
introduce the recent investigations of the neurological and behavioristic 
psychologists, Warren S. McCulloch and Walter Pitts. 
Neurologically Trapped Equivalents of Universals. One of the great merits 
of Underhill Moore's sociological jurisprudence was its analytic precision. 
It achieved generality because it treated the living law of a culture in terms 
of the overt behavior of all the individuals making up the culture. It had 
the precision also of being deductively formulated. Both of these sources of 
precision were present because Underhill Moore based his final legal science 
upon the deductively formulated, behavioristic psychology of his Yale col- 
league Clark Hull. 
In Underhill Moore's use of this psychology, he treated all symbols merely 
as stimuli, ignoring their meaning. This tended to make it appear that all 
individual behavior and also the high-frequency group behavior which defined 
the living law norm is the mere effect of passing stimuli. On this basis it is 
difficult to understand how ideas and meanings, or, in other words, basic 
philosophical assumptions can have the significance in defining the living law 
of a culture which Sorokin's sociology and Kluckhohn's anthropology demon- 
strate. 
McCulloch and Pitts have shown,39 however, that recent neurological re- 
search and theory necessitates the reconstruction of Hull's behavioristic psy- 
chology in crucially important ways. They noted that if the nerve cells or 
neurons of the human nervous system were ordered linearly, then the 
stimulus would completely determine the response, and philosophical concepts 
would have the irrelevance in human behavior which many previous thinkers 
have supposed to be the case. In technical terms the stimulus of the sensory 
neuron would fire the intervening cortical neurons in the linear net which 
in turn would fire the motor neuron, thereby producing the overt, muscular 
behavioristic response. Thus the stimulus alone would determine the behavior, 
the intervening cortical neurons being merely carriers of the impulse from the 
stimulus to the motor response. (See upper part of diagram, following page). 
McCulloch and Pitts recalled Lorente de No's demonstration that cortical 
neurons are often arranged in a circle to which a sensory neuron comes and 
from which a motor neuron departs, after the manner indicated in the lower 
part of the diagram. These three investigators present physiological evidence 
for believing that the firing of the sensory neuron fires one of the cortical 
neurons in the circle and that this cortical neuron in turn fires its succeeding 
39. McCulloch & Pitts, How We Know Universals, 5 BULL. OF MATHEMATICAL 
BIOPHYSICS 115-33 (1943); McCulloch, A Hierarchy of Values Determined by the 
Topology of Nervous Nets, id. at 89-93. See also Rosenblueth, Wiener & Bigelow, Be- 
havior, Purpose and Teleology, 10 PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE No. 1, 18-24 (1943). For a 
summary of the foregoing material see Northrop, The Neurological and Behavioristic 
Psychological Basis for the Ordering of Society by Means of Ideas, 107 SCIENCE No. 
2782, 411-17 (1948) and IDEOLOGICAL DIFFERENCES AND WORLD ORDER, op. cit. supra 
note 38, at c. XIX. 
1952] 641 
This content downloaded from 130.132.173.108 on Thu, 30 May 2013 16:42:23 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL 
neuron in the circle and so on. Suppose that the time it takes to pass this 
impulse representing the stimulus from one neuron to another around the 
circle is longer than the refractory phase required by any neuron in the 
circle to have its energy restored by the metabolic process of the body, after 
it has fired. Then the impulse will be passed continuously around the circle 
as long as the human being in question lives. Such a circular net, together with 
the impulse being permanently passed around it by the successive firings of its 
neurons, is a reverberating circuit. 
LNEAR NEURAL NET 
STIMULUS D D DD D RESOVERT 
~~~-""^o~~~~~~~ i - 
RESPONSE 
SENSORY CORTICAL NEURONS MOTOR 
NEURON NEURON 
NON LINEAR NEURAL NET 
S E It 
( WHEN IMPULSE 
SENSORY IS PASSED AROUND MOOR 
NEURON FR ONE NEUON NEURON 
STIMULUS CP 
/ s^ mOVERT 
~~~~~/ ^^7 /^~ ~RESPONSE 
CIRCULAR 
CORTICAL NET 
The persisting impulse in the reverberating circuit "represents the stimulus 
that is gone. When something represents something else, it is a symbol. Thus 
McCulloch and Pitts noted that in the trapped impulses of reverberating cortical 
circuits one has the neurological correlate of what introspective psychology calls 
a meaning or a universal. 
"Suppose there are several such neurally connected circuits with their differ- 
ent trapped representatives of diverse stimuli or environmental facts. Con- 
nected meanings give propositions and connected propositions give theories. 
Suppose also that some trapped impulses representing certain facts in ex- 
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perience (i.e., stimuli) are used to define others. Then the trapped universals 
will be ordered hierarchically in the cortex. Thus the distinction between basic 
or philosophical concepts and derived, more inductively given, concepts will 
arise. 
"Suppose also that this hierarchy of meanings can both effect the firing of 
one motor neuron and inhibit the firing of another, as McCulloch shows to 
be the case. Then we see how philosophy not only can, but must, serve as 
the normative judge and censor of any stimulus striking a sensory neuron, 
defining what passes over into overt behavior and what does not. Thus, both 
law and ethics, as grounded in the trapped universals placed at the top of the 
cortical hierarchy because of their capacity to prepare the human organism 
for any stimuli hitting it, become intelligible. Neurological and introspective 
psychology hereby combine to affirm that behavior is a response not to 
stimuli alone, but to ideas found to be basic in remembering, describing and 
integrating the stimuli, and in enabling one to anticipate tomorrow's stimuli. 
When many people agree on these basic meanings, one has a single culture."40 
One has also a communal, rather than merely a personal, ethics and living law. 
Contemporary sociology, anthropology and neurological psychology con- 
verge, therefore, upon the conclusion that Underhill Moore's sociological juris- 
prudence must be amended in the following manner: Between the stimulus 
which fires the sensory neuron and the motor neuron which fires the muscles to 
produce observable overt behavior, there must be placed the reverberating 
circuits of the human cortex which contain the trapped equivalents of intro- 
spected ideas. It is reasonable to assume also that the correlates of these 
trapped impulses representing their respective sensory stimuli must appear in 
introspective consciousness and in linguistic communication as the directly 
inspected meanings and ideas of scientific and philosophical theory. 
This reformulation introduces into sociological jurisprudence a much more 
simple, economical and effective way of objectively determining the living law 
of a given people or culture. One has merely to question them verbally to 
bring out their basic concepts and philosophy, as did KIuckhohn with the 
Navaho Indians, noting the consequences of this philosophy as it flows over 
into and is confirmed by their overt behavior, positive legal norms, and de- 
cisions. In cultures which have a written literature one need merely study 
their basic scientific treatises concerning nature and their basic philosophical 
treatises to discover the underlying concepts used to describe and integrate 
the raw data of human experience, watching in turn their manifestations and 
confirmation in overt behavior, art forms, social institutions, positive legal 
documents and codes. 
Unlike the sociological jurisprudence of Underhill Moore or Lasswell and 
McDougal, this is a workable method of determining the living law in any 
culture. To use Underhill Moore's sociological jurisprudence in the Hindu 
40. Northrop, supra note 37. 
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culture of India it would be necessary to determine objectively the spacio- 
temporal motions of some 350,000,000 individual Hindus. Obviously, this 
is impossible. Yet without it the living law is not determined since high- 
frequency behavior has no meaning apart from the determination of the 
behavior of all. When one notes, however, the connection between neuro- 
logically trapped universals in the human cortex and introspected or linguistic- 
ally and publicly expressed meanings, one can use these recorded meanings 
rather than the overt behavior of 350,000,000 individual Hindus to determine 
objectively their living law. 
More specifically this means that instead of undertaking the impossible task 
of having sociological jurists, using behavioristic psychology, report the spacio- 
temporal motions of 350,000,000 Hindus, one will read the Vedic hymns, the 
Upanishads, and the Bhagavadgita together with the philosophical commen- 
taries thereon by Sankara and Ramanuja. Then one must compare these 
philosophical treatises with an inductive inspection of the overt behavior of 
Hindus, their ritualism, and the positive law in the Code of Manu and the 
other Hindu law treatises. Obviously this is a much more economical objec- 
tive way of determining the living law than would be required by the socio- 
logical jurisprudence of either an Underhill Moore or Lasswell and McDougal, 
with the latter's ten different value categories which would have to be 
determined for 350,000,000 Hindus. 
This philosophical method of objectively defining the living law also avoids 
the weakness which Underhill Moore noted in his own sociological jurispru- 
dence. This weakness consisted in his being unable to define, other than in an 
arbitrary way, the line which distinguishes high-frequency, and in his sense 
good living law, from low-frequency, or bad living law. In the philosophical 
jurisprudence based on the McCulloch and Pitts neurological behaviorism 
correlated with introspective psychology, the good living law is defined not 
quantitatively but qualitatively in terms of philosophical ideas and doctrines. 
Conduct within a particular living law is good if it corresponds to the philoso- 
phy of the community in question, bad if it does not. Quantity has nothing 
to do with the matter. What made the use of Hindu private law necessary in 
British India was not the fact that there are 350,000,000 Hindus, but belief 
in and practice of Hindu doctrines by Indian disputants in India's courts. 
Thus, it is not the high-frequency Gallup Poll statistics, which may express 
little more than a whim or hysteria of the moment, but the persisting philoso- 
phy of the community that provides the scientific basis for normative judicial 
decisions. The Feinberg Law passed hastily by the New York Legislature 
and upheld later by the United States Supreme Court 41 as compared with 
the philosophical basis of Justice Douglas' dissent illustrates this difference 
41. Adler v. Board of Education, 20 U.S.L. WEEK 4127 (U.S. March 3, 1952). The 
Feinberg Law makes membership in any organization which advocates overthrow of the 
government by violence prima facie evidence of disqualification for employment in the 
public school system. 
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between a quantitative mood of the moment and qualitative sociological juris- 
prudence. 
No judge in finding the ground for his decision has to add up countless 
continuously changing empirically determined quantities after the manner of 
the sociological jurisprudence of either Underhill Moore or Lasswell and 
McDougal. The basis for any decision is always some determinate proposition 
with content defining a doctrine. 
This does not mean that in determining the living law of any culture or 
people inductive studies may not be valuable. The more empirical the deter- 
mination, the richer the content of the living law; hence the great importance 
of Underhill Moore's institutional studies and those of Lasswell and Mc- 
Dougal. Fully adequate inductive investigation must, however, supplement 
and simplify the latter by concentrating attention on the empirical determina- 
tion of the logico-meaningful or philosophically basic doctrines held in 
common by large numbers of people in the particular society being studied. 
Otherwise, the inner order of the inductive data is not specified, without 
which, as Ehrlich has made clear, there is no specification of the living law. 
The restriction to beliefs held in common by large numbers of people is 
justified because it is only common beliefs that are community beliefs and 
hence effective living and positive common principles. There may be countless 
other philosophical beliefs differing from one another held by large numbers 
of people in the community but, precisely because any one of them is not held 
in common by a large number of other people, it is the living law belief of 
but one person, not the living law belief of the society. It is only living law 
philosophical beliefs held in common by large numbers of people in the 
society which give the society the inner order which is its living law. 
The complex culture of India just before the partition into Pakistan and the 
present New Delhi India will serve as an example. This total culture ex- 
hibited three diverse and in part conflicting living laws. One was the living 
law of the pre-Western Hindu community. This is made determinate in an 
objective manner when the basic philosophical conceptions of nature and man 
in the fundamental scientific and philosophical books and commentaries 
mentioned above are studied. The Hindu positive law corresponding to this 
underlying Hindu living law is presented in an objective manner in the law 
books of Manu, Gautama, Apastamba and others. The second living law of 
the former India is that of the Muslim community. It is made determinate 
in an objective manner when the conception of man in his relation to the rest 
of reality, as rooted in the Quran and the attendant philosophical doctrines of 
Arabia and Persia, is made explicit. Given this philosophical determination 
of Islamic living law in India, the corresponding positive laws concerning 
marriage, inheritance, tithes, etc., become similarly determinate and intelligible. 
The third major legal factor in the old India is the modern Western political 
and legal institutions and doctrines. This came to India first as a positive 
law. When the British were there it was a living law to the extent that, 
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because of their army and their jurisdiction, it had to be accepted. The 
extent to which it is a living law now that the British have left remains to 
be seen. The present Indian Constitution, and Prime Minister Nehru's secular 
state measure the extent to which modern Western positive law has become 
India's living law. The recent defeat of the Hindu reform bill which would 
have restricted Hindu living law in the light of Anglo-American secular 
living and positive law suggests that it is not yet very great. 
In this connection Pakistan has rejected a secular state for an Islamic one. 
This means that for the Muslim community of old India, w,hich is now in 
Pakistan, the British positive law has been rejected as a criterion of the norms 
for Pakistan's present living and positive law. It is precisely because the philo- 
sophical beliefs which define the living law of the Muslim community are so 
different from and even antithetical to the philosophical beliefs specifying 
the living law of the Hindu community of old India that the partition into 
Pakistan and present India became necessary. These events and the deter- 
minate philosophical content of the diverse Hindu, Muslim and British living 
law doctrines are objective facts. What is true of the society which is India, 
is true of any society. 
A sociological jurisprudence, therefore, which identifies the living law of 
any culture with the philosophy of that culture provides a method42 of 
specifying grundnorms for positive law which are not merely objective but 
also possessed of specific content. Unlike the pure theory of law and a priori 
ethical jurisprudence, legal science is not left with a purely vacuous ethical 
postulate. Moreover, it will be effective because a positive law whose 
grundnorms are specified in this manner will of necessity have the spontaneous 
sanctions of the living law behind it. No problem of legal obligation will arise. 
This new jurisprudence may be appropriately termed philosophical sociological 
jurisprudence. 
PHILOSOPHICAL SOCIOLOGICAL JURISPRUDENCE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 
Philosophical sociological jurisprudence 43 makes it clear that the con- 
temporary world does not have a single living law. Contemporary India has 
three major living laws and India is but one small portion of the world. 
Present China, apart from Formosa, has two major living laws, Taoist- 
Buddhist-Confucianism and Marxist Communism, both of which are in part at 
least different from any of the three living laws of India. Chinese Marxist 
42. For an exact specification of the scientific method of this philosophical sociological 
jurisprudence, see Northrop, The Importance of Deductively Formulated Theory in Ethics 
and Social and Legal Science in STRUcrURE, METHOD AND MEANING, ESSAYS IN HONOR 
OF HENRY SHEFFER 99-114 (Henle, Kallen & Langer eds. 1951). 
43. "Sociological" is used throughout in the broad sense of any social science includ- 
ing anthropology and social psychology as well as sociology proper. This jurisprudence 
might as appropriately be called "Philosophical Anthropological Jurisprudence." 
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Communism is in fact only a positive law used by President Mao and his 
colleagues in the hope of creating a new living law. Roman Catholic cultures 
in the West exhibit another major living law of the world. It is defined 
in major part by the philosophy and theology of St. Thomas Aquinas. Those 
modem nations of the West heavily under Protestant religious and modem 
scientific and philosophical influence illustrate a still different living law of 
which the United States is the purest case. The philosophy which specifies 
this living law is that of British empiricism as worked out by Hobbes, Locke, 
Hume, Adam Smith, Jefferson, Mill and Bentham, Jevons, Keynes and the 
Austrian School of Economists. The legal theory of this philosophical living 
law is legal positivism. 
Since the underlying living laws of the world are many in number rather 
than one, the way to an effective international law is to base it upon the 
world's living law pluralism. Only if this is done will positive international 
law possess the underlying living law sanctions which sociological jurispru- 
dence demonstrates that any positive law must have if it is to be effective. 
What this means specifically will become clearer if the matter is first ap- 
proached in a negative manner, by considering existing international law and 
more particularly the Charter of the United Nations. The Charter gives the 
impression that the world is in complete agreement upon a single set of 
determinate world norms. Did not each official representative of most of the 
nations of the world sign a document in which he dedicated his government 
to the building of a world order in which "freedom," "wellbeing," "economic 
uplift" and "the good life" would come to all men ? This impression of a single 
world living law is however quite superficial and spurious, for the basic norma- 
tive words "freedom," "wellbeing," "economic uplift" and "the good life" are 
left undefined. Nor is it difficult to find the reason for this lack of definition 
and the resultant vituperation, which has followed when subsequent foreign 
ministers read the definitions required by their differing and often conflicting 
living laws into these otherwise vacuous words. 
The existing international law and the United Nations Charter are the 
creation of traditional Western or Westernized Asian legal minds. Such 
minds conceive of law in terms of legal positivism or a priori ethical juris- 
prudence. As the earlier portion of this study has shown, both of these schools 
leave the content of the basic ethical norms of any legal system indeterminate. 
Under such circumstances, the United Nations Charter does not deserve to 
receive the support of any nation without the reservation of a veto, No 
nation or people will or should transfer one iota of sovereignty to any 
positive international legal institution unless the charter or constitution of 
that international body specifies the living law norms of the people in 
question. And it must guarantee those specific norms under any and all cir- 
cumstances. Nor would a transfer of sovereignty without such constitutional 
specification and guarantee be accepted by any nation in a crucial case even 
if it were initially granted without the reservation of a veto. For sociological 
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jurisprudence makes it clear that positive law always breaks down when it 
goes counter to the underlying living law. 
The first step, therefore, toward the achievement of a more effective world 
legal order is to face and honestly and explicitly accept, rather than obscure 
and ignore, the living law pluralism of the world. This entails the writing of 
a world constitution grounded in an explicitly pluralistic rather than a vacu- 
ously monistic theory of world sovereignty. The specific living law philoso- 
phies of the diverse nations and cultures of the world must be spelled out 
and guaranteed within their own particular respective geographical areas 
under any and all circumstances unless changed by the people in those areas 
themselves. Then and only then will any nation be justified in transferring 
specified sovereign power to the international legal body without the reserva- 
tion of a veto. 
To such a pluralistic philosophically and sociologically grounded interna- 
tional law each nation could commit that specific portion of its life 
which is international in character without reservation. It would have the 
guarantee that its own particular living law assumptions and values would be 
explicitly understood, honored and protected. Such an international law would 
have truly realistic and objective world-wide support because it would ex- 
plicitly specify and have behind it not only the particular philosophical living 
law of one's own nation, tradition and culture, but also those of the many 
other living laws of the world. Let it not be forgotten that these diverse 
living law cultures with their different specific, basic philosophical doctrines 
and attendant positive legal norms are very real and objective things. An 
international legal world order with such factual foundations would be no 
will-of-the-wisp. 
Legal science shows also that there is no such thing as the protection of 
law without corresponding duties. Under pluralistic philosophical sociological 
jurisprudence both the protective rights and the duties become clear. Such 
an international law guarantees the right of any people or nation to build their 
social institutions in the light of their own cultural traditions and needs, draw- 
ing upon the values of other nations only as they deem wise. This is tanta- 
mount to the outlawing of any nation which by military aggression or other 
means interferes with this right. In return for this protective right, a nation 
has the corresponding duty, without veto or reservation, to contribute its share 
of military and police power necessary to curtail and punish the outlawed 
nation wherever and whenever its illegal conduct occurs. 
Pluralistic sociological jurisprudence would prescribe also more stringent 
admission requirements than is the case with the United Nations. When the 
specification of the living law philosophy of any particular nation reveals its 
philosophy to be regarded by it as the sole normative criterion for interna- 
tional judgment of other nations with a different philosophy, the explicit 
written repudiation without later reservation of such claims must be re- 
quired before the admission of that nation to status under international law. 
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Otherwise the admission of such a nation would be equivalent to the accept- 
ance of the monistic principle of sovereignty in international law. This is 
clearly logically incompatible with an international law grounded in the 
principle of living law pluralism. 
A discouraging result of the United Nations police action in Korea is 
the failure of so many members to assume any responsibility for it. In 
fact even members which are not Communistic have refused to regard the 
United Nations' action in Korea as a police action. Instead many have 
interpreted it as a power politics game or ideological battle between the 
United States and Soviet Russia.44 
This response is in part justified because even the United States has 
tended to interpret the responsibility for the police action of the United 
Nations as entailing a choice between the American way of life and that of 
Marxist Russian Communism. Since no responsible non-Communist govern- 
ment in Asia or the Middle East wants either to be a mere pawn in a power 
politics game or to reject its own indigenous living law norms for those of 
either America or Russia, the result naturally is the refusal to choose sides 
with its attendant non-support and, in some cases, opposition to the U. N.'s 
police action. This means that the climate of opinion necessary to prevent 
aggression from occurring or the communal responsibility for policing aggres- 
sion when it occurs does not exist in the world community today. 
The reason for this situation is evident. It centers in the old habit of judg- 
ing international relations in terms of one ideology alone or, in other words, 
in terms of a monistic theory of international legal sovereignty. So long as 
the support of the police action under world law is put on the basis of choosing 
the specific living and positive law norm of one disputant and his friends 
rather than of another, the failure of world law to command the community 
support necessary to make it effective will continue. 
The moment, however, that international law acknowledges living law 
pluralism and grounds itself in this living law fact, the foregoing grounds for 
any nation's refusal to assume its share of the responsibility in policing a 
violation of world law are removed. Then the justification for police action 
is not that the living and positive law ideology of one of the disputants is 
right and that of the other wrong, but that the principle of living law pluralism 
has been violated. Upon this basis no nation in the world community is forced 
to choose between either ideology of the disputants. It is simply sharing the 
common responsibility of guaranteeing to others and to itself the right of the 
people of any nation to give expression to their own cultural living law norms 
while drawing upon those of others as they themselves choose, regardless of 
what the respective cultural traditions and choices may be. 
44. See, e.g., Gross, Voting in the Security Council: Abstention From Voting and 
Absence From Meetings, 60 YALE L. J. 209 (1951); Kogan, United Nations-Agent of 
Collective Security?, 61 YALE L.J. 1 (1952); cf. McDougal & Gardner, The Veto and 
the Charter: An Interpretation For Survival, 60 YALE L. J. 258 (1951). 
1952] 649 
This content downloaded from 130.132.173.108 on Thu, 30 May 2013 16:42:23 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL 
NATURAL LAW JURISPRUDENCE 
Nothwithstanding these merits and its immediate practicality for interna- 
tional law, philosophical sociological jurisprudence does not constitute a final 
and complete theory of law in general or of international law in particular. 
This becomes evident when one notes that the existing living law of each and 
every nation or culture in the world is not only being accepted but also being 
reformed. Reform requires passing judgment on the living law of sociological 
jurisprudence. 
An adequate theory of law must provide meaning, therefore, for a moral and 
legal statement which affirms the living law of one's own culture to be in 
whole or in part "bad" and hence in need of reform. Moreover, however much 
one may and must try to live within the pluralism and relativism of the 
world's many living laws, this is not in the last analysis completely possible 
nor is it completely "good." It is necessary, therefore, to provide some meaning 
for the prediction of the words "good" and "bad" of the living law itself. This 
requires the specification of some meaning for, and the objective method of 
verifying, the statement that the living law conduct, for example, of Hitler's 
Germany was "bad" and "illegal," even if it had restricted itself to the treat- 
ment of Germans. The same is necessary for any objective moral or legal 
judgment of Marxist Communism, of the laissez-faire living law philosophy of 
the traditional pre-New Deal Supreme Court or of traditional Islam, Hindu- 
ism or Confucianism. Clearly, we cannot avoid going on beyond the many 
philosophies which define the many diverse living laws of sociological juris- 
prudence to the question of the respective merits and deficiencies of these 
diverse living laws including even one's own. 
Even though philosophical sociological jurisprudence cannot answer this 
question, it nevertheless points the way. Sorokin's sociology, Kluckhohn's 
anthropology and McCulloch and Pitts' psychology have already given the 
clue. What are the basic philosophical concepts or trapped universals which 
specify the normative inner order of any society which is its particular 
living law? Any specific set of these concepts is a particular way of remem- 
bering, conceiving and anticipating the stimuli or raw data of natural experi- 
ence. In other words, although the philosophy of a given person or people 
refers for its normative prescriptions to culture, it refers to physical nature 
and natural man for its origin and empirical verification. In other words no 
philosophy is merely a specification of a living law for society; it is also at 
the same time an empirically originated and hence objectively verifiable 
theory of nature. 
For example, Sorokin has shown that differences in the living and corre- 
sponding positive law norms of different societies are essentially connected 
with whether they use one type of scientific and philosophical concept or 
another in their conceptualization of nature. Kluckhohn has shown similarly 
that the philosophy and attendant living and positive law norms of the 
Navaho Indians are in considerable part at least a function of the way they 
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conceive of the facts of nature. Differing theories of the facts of nature can be 
tested as to their truth or falsity empirically. Moreover, of two theories both 
of which have empirical facts in their support, the one can be shown to be 
more true than the other if it is the only theory which can take care of all 
the facts leading to the two theories. 
Hence, by testing the diverse philosophies of the world's many living laws 
against the raw data of natural experience common to all men, one has the 
required objective meaning for, and method 45 of, specifying the truth or falsity 
of, ethical and legal judgments about the world's diverse living laws of socio- 
logical jurisprudence. It is at this point, by this objective empirical method, 
that philosophical sociological jurisprudence passes over into a truly universal 
philosophy of nature or natural law jurisprudence with specific content. 
The so-called universal natural law theories of jurisprudence which exist at 
present are not truly universal. Consider the traditional Roman Catholic natural 
law jurisprudence. Although its Aristotelian content insures that it is as much a 
theory of the empirically verifiable "is" concerning nature, as it is an "ought" 
for society and culture, it is clearly only one of the many such theories of 
the diverse cultures, peoples and nations of the world. Thus its proclaimed 
universality is not truly universal in the sense of a natural law jurisprudence 
that has first passed through the philosophical sociological jurisprudence of 
the world's many living laws. The latter type of sociological jurisprudence 
recognizes that each particular living law culture of the world regards its 
particular philosophy as a natural law jurisprudence which is universal. P. V. 
Kane has shown this to be the case for Hindu culture.46 Others have shown 
it to be true for pre-westernized Chinese society.47 Thus the traditional 
theories of natural law jurisprudence do not constitute a truly universal 
natural law jurisprudence. They are merely different provincial philosophies 
of nature and culture generalized dogmatically for the rest of the world. 
A truly universal natural law jurisprudence with specific content will be at 
hand only when the following things are done: (a) One must go behind each 
of the philosophies of the world's many living laws to the facts of physical 
nature from which each arose and to which each appeals for its verification. 
(b) The present analysis of the experimentally verified theories of contempor- 
ary mathematical physics must be completed to determine the philosophy of 
nature which these theories entail. It is likely that only thus will the new 
philosophical norms be found for ordering a society whose technology derives 
45. See further, NORTHROP, The Criterion of the Good State and The Scientific 
Method for D:eterm.ining :the. Normative Social Theory of the Ends of Human Action 
in THE LOGIC or THE- SCIENCES AND THE HUMANITIES cc. XVII, XXI (1947). 
46. 3 KANE, HISTORY OF DIHARMASASTRA 244-5 (1946); see also Northrop, Natural- 
istic and Cultural Foundations for a More Effective International Law, 59 YALE L. J. 
1430-50 (1950). 
47. DORSEY, Two Objective Bases for a World-Wide Legal Order in IDEOLOGICAL 
DIFFERENCES AND WORLD ORDER (Northrop ed. 1949); NEEDHAM, HUMAN LAW AND 
THE LAWS OF NATURE IN CHINA AND THE WEST (1951). 
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from these theories of mathematical physics. (c) Finally the natural philoso- 
phy which combines (a) and (b) must be formulated and its new living law 
reforms for the world must be specified. These are tasks for the future. 
Moreover only when this truly universal natural law jurisprudence is 
specified in detail by the aforementioned methods yet to be applied, will it be 
possible to rear international law on the monistic theory of sovereignty of a 
truly universal natural law jurisprudence rather than on the pluralistic theory 
of philosophical sociological jurisprudence. The natural law jurisprudence 
of the Roman Catholic jurist is no more acceptable to a Confucian Chinese 
natural law jurist than the Confucian content for natural law is acceptable 
to a Roman Catholic. The time therefore when international law can be based 
effectively upon natural law jurisprudence is in the future. For this reason 
international law based on the pluralistic living law of philosophical socio- 
logical jurisprudence is the only immediately effective way to bring inter- 
national disputes under the rule of law. 
Once such an international law is established, two ways from it toward the 
eventual monistic concept of international law of a truly universal natural law 
jurisprudence can be pursued. Moreover their pursuit will bring much quicker 
results than might at first be supposed. Both methods are suggested by 
sociological jurisprudence. 
The first is well known, especially in the West, where it is called jus 
gentium. This is the way suggested by Pound in his recent article, Toward 
a New Jus Gentium.48 It consists in examining the diverse philosophical 
doctrines, or as he terms them "world-pictures," defining the different living 
laws of the world to find the assumptions and attendant positive legal norms 
which they have in common. This jus gentium is appropriately called the 
sociological jus gentium since it is a worldwide common law which philo- 
sophical sociological jurisprudence can discover and define. The specification 
of the common philosophical assumptions underlying many of the diverse 
cultures and living laws of the East and the West has been sketched else- 
where.49 This movement towards a truly worldwide sociological jus gentium 
has the merit of pushing the differences between the world's diverse living 
laws, momentarily at least, into the background and of pulling the identities 
of doctrine out into the foreground. 
Notwithstanding these virtues, this approach to a monistic world law and 
philosophy by way of the sociological jus gentium is not as promising as 
might at first appear. For the issues of war or peace in the world as illustrated 
by Pakistan and Hindu India or by Soviet Russia and the Western democra- 
cies turn not around the more abstract philosophical premises which the 
disputants may have in common, but upon the assumptions which differentiate 
the one from the other. Important, therefore, as the sociological jus gentium 
48. Pound, sitpra note 1. 
49. NORTHROP, THE MEETING OF EAST AND WEST (1946); Dorsey, supra note 47. 
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is as a way from the pluralism of the world's living law to a legal monism, it 
is not enough. 
The second way to the monism of a truly universal natural law jurispru- 
dence is by the application of the method of the philosophy of nature and the 
contemporary philosophy of natural science to the reform of the traditional 
philosophies which define the status quo living laws of the world. By this 
means the weak sociological jus gentium becomes enriched by, strengthened, 
and transformed into the eventual natural law jus gentium or jus naturale. 
This transformation will come about much faster than might at first be 
supposed because it also has support in the living law. Every nation and 
culture in the world today, Oriental as well as Occidental, is not merely re- 
vivifying its indigenous living law but also reforming it. This reform move- 
ment is as much a living law fact as is the traditional unique living law of 
each nation or culture which is being reformed. 
Furthermore, one of the main things behind this reform is the desire of the 
leaders of every people and nation to introduce Western technology in order 
to raise the well-being of the masses of people generally. This Western tech- 
nology can be operated efficiently only by grasping in considerable part at least 
the basic concepts of Western science. But to grasp these basic concepts is to 
become acquainted in part with the philosophy of Western natural science and 
thus to be led to look at one's own living law from the standpoint of this 
new philosophy of nature and the natural law jurisprudence which its appli- 
cation to social conduct entails. 
CONCLUSION 
An adequate legal science must be composed of three parts: (1) The posi- 
tive law of legal positivism and a priori ethical jurisprudence; (2) the world's 
living laws as specified by philosophical sociological jurisprudence; and (3) 
the natural law of naturalistic jurisprudence and its naturalistic jus gentium. 
Without the positive law neither sociological nor naturalistic jurists know 
the operational definitions and consequences with respect to concrete disputes 
and cases which their more abstract doctrines entail. Without sociological 
jurisprudence, positive law is either ethically vacuous or arbitrary. Without 
philosophy, sociological jurisprudence cannot specify in a brief practicable 
manner what the normative inner order of the living law in any society is. 
Without philosophical sociological jurisprudence and the pluralism of the 
world's living laws which it reveals, no immediately effective international law 
adequate to the needs of an atomic age is possible. And without naturalistic 
jurisprudence there is no criterion of good or bad living law or of the 
specific direction which reform of the living law should take. 
Just as the specific content of the basic norms of positive law can be 
judged to be "good" or "bad" only by recourse to the living law, so the basic 
norms exhibited in the living law can be judged to be good or bad only by 
resorting to natural law. Even so a law based on the living law of philosophi- 
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cal sociological jurisprudence is the only immediately practical and effective 
international law, since a truly universal natural law is yet to be specified, 
though the method for determining it is known. 
These conclusions permit a determinate answer to the question with 
which this inquiry began: Does contemporary jurisprudence indicate, as 
the advocates of legal positivism and power politics affirm, that the attempt 
in an atomic age to bring disputes between nations under the effective rule 
of law is impractical and immoral-doing in the end more harm than good? 
The answer is an unequivocal No! It is the "give-it-up" philosophy, not the 
attempt to achieve an effective international law, which must be given up. 
The dying legal science is legal positivism. The living fact is the pluralism of 
the world's living laws which philosophical sociological jurisprudence reveals, 
developing, with the introduction and understanding of scientific technology, 
into a natural law jurisprudence with truly universal specific content. Where 
there are such living law facts there can be an effective international law. 
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